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I explore Vladimir Bartol’s Alamut, drawing on its sociopolitical context in 1938 
Slovenia, as a cautionary tale about potential unjust consequences of putting into 
practice Plato’s model of a just city-state, as described in the Republic (380 BC). I 
also investigate how key structures of Plato’s republic have been applied to 
ideologically driven European totalitarian states and modern terrorist 
organizations, such as al-Qaeda, and argue that the injustice of such institutions 
has its origins in the deception at the core of their guiding creeds. Following the 
critiques of Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai in “Monster, Terrorist, Fag” (2002), I 
conclude by addressing how Alamut, as a novel that cautions against ideologies, 
advances particular racial ideologies itself regarding the Middle East’s 
relationship to terrorism. I explore key implications of this understanding of the 
novel as we consider the inherent dangers of the inescapable tool that is ideology.  
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Plato’s Republic (ca. 380 BC) has long influenced political philosophy with its 
elaborate account of how a just state should be constructed, expressed through the 
character of Socrates in characteristic Socratic dialogue form. Vladimir Bartol’s 
Slovenian novel Alamut (1938) challenges views advanced in Republic as to how 
leadership ought to operate in the just city-state. Plato has inspired a variety of 
political structures; this essay will follow the tradition of interpreting Republic as 
totalitarian and will identify structural elements that support this classification. 
Alamut challenges Plato’s political model as the most just by showing through 
allegory how the leader of such a regime, whom Plato calls the philosopher-king, 
is able to, unchecked by external authorities, construct and enforce an ideology 
that promotes unjust ends. Alamut lends itself to being read as an allegorical 
portrayal of both Plato’s just republic and the ideologically driven totalitarian 
regimes that overtook World War II-era Europe. In this paper, I contest Plato’s 
claim that knowledge of virtue necessarily compels virtuous behavior of the wise 
and use Alamut to show that such transcendent wisdom can actually empower 
leaders to construct ideologies that, rather than actually promoting virtue, instead 
manipulate the masses toward vice in service of the leader’s personal agenda. 
Guided by its historical context, I investigate Alamut as a cautionary tale that 
imagines potential consequences of Plato’s Republic and also address how his 
model manifests in terrorist organizations today. My project aims to highlight the 
power of ideology, both as presented in Alamut as well as through Alamut, as the 
novel itself extends certain stereotypes regarding the Middle East’s relationship to 
terrorism.  
 
Historical Context for Alamut  
Born in Trieste, Austria-Hungary, in 1903,Vladimir Bartol studied everything 
from philosophy and literature to biology and psychology, all of which figure 
centrally in Alamut. While studying in Paris in his late teens, Bartol found 
inspiration for his masterpiece from a friend who introduced him to “Old Man of 
the Mountain,” Marco Polo’s tale of the fortress of Alamut, which he had 
encountered on his travels. This account describes a powerful warlord who won 
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his men’s “fanatical loyalty” and used it to spread his power through suicide 
missions. Bartol spent a decade developing Alamut, situating it in an eleventh 
century Iranian setting so well-researched that nothing about the novel suggests 
its Slovenian roots except for the language in which it was originally written 
(Biggins 382).  
  The political context lurking in the background of Alamut’s construction 
informs not only its reception but also its key themes. Slovenia was annexed by 
Germany and Italy between 1941 and 1945, and the communist Yugoslavian 
regime saw the book as threatening for years (Biggins 382). The prevalent 
Slovenian view that literature could build national unity hindered Alamut’s 
reception because, for reasons that will become clear, the book may be interpreted 
as a subversive criticism of the existing regime and of conformity of thought 
(Komel 356). Totalitarian regimes were sprouting up across Europe at the time of 
Alamut’s formation, and Michael Biggins, translator of the English edition of the 
novel, suggests that we can read it as an allegory of early-1900s European 
totalitarianism. Biggins observes, “Hasan ibn Sabbah, the hyper-rationalistic 
leader of the Ismaili sect, becomes a composite portrait of Mussolini, Hitler, and 
Stalin” (383). Given Biggins’ reading of Alamut, I will follow his commentary on 
the novel as a cautionary tale against the political exploitation of ideologies to 
oppress the masses.  
 
Plato’s Republic and the Fortress of Alamut as Totalitarian States  
This concept of a hyper-rationalistic leader ruling a state is also forwarded by 
Plato. In “Plato’s Totalitarianism,” C.C.W. Taylor assesses the status of Plato’s 
just state, as described in Republic, as totalitarian (280-82). He identifies two key 
characteristics of totalitarian states: authoritarianism and ideology. 
Authoritarianism is marked by a lack of significant power on the behalf of 
ordinary citizens to influence political decisions. Ideology is defined as “a 
pervasive scheme of values…promoted by institutional means in order to direct 
all or the most significant aspects of public and private life towards the attainment 
of the goals dictated by those values” (Taylor 280). Under these definitions, 
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Taylor concludes that Plato’s ideal state is totalitarian. It is authoritarian because 
all political decisions are in the hands of the philosopher-king and not the citizens. 
Further, it is ideological: the leaders’ knowledge of the “Good” (referring to the 
Form of the Good in Plato’s metaphysics) is the basis for their authority and the 
source for the state ideology’s content. What leaders promote as Good is realized 
in the state through a tight-knit system of education, politics, and morality, and 
each citizen is expected to defend and advance this ideology. It should be noted 
that while Taylor and other scholars regard Plato’s Republic as solidly totalitarian, 
it has also been read as everything from democratic to oligarchical. In this paper, I 
maintain that central elements of Plato’s republic may at least plausibly be applied 
to the construction of a totalitarian state. 
 Alamut exemplifies the totalitarian model described in Republic. It is 
founded on the unquestioned authority of Hasan, the philosopher-king of Alamut, 
and on the ideology that he has constructed and integrated into every aspect of his 
fortress. Ibn Tahir, a fresh and particularly keen feday, or warrior, notices the 
rigidity with which Alamut is internally organized from early on: “He had already 
begun to recognize that this new world had its own hard and fast rules, that it was 
organized and governed from within, from the inside out, and that its structure 
was consistent, logical, and complete” (Bartol 55). Each class, from the houris to 
the fedayeen to the dais, is to perform only its assigned role, and none may 
question the established system or Hasan’s intentions behind it. Miriam, one of 
the houris, or maidens of paradise, also realizes that “Hasan’s behavior had been 
utterly consistent” (196). Each of his beliefs, from his “contempt for everything 
the masses held sacred and indisputable,” to his “ambivalence about all received 
knowledge,” to his “absolute freedom of thought and action,” reflect his critical 
worldview and guide his governance (196). Using the absolute authority he 
establishes by constructing a false religious ideology, Hasan is able to enforce 
unjust totalitarian rule and to earn his faithful followers’ support for it. To 
preserve their faith, he, at all costs, maintains the consistency of his ideology, 
even publicly killing his son and only heir to show that his laws bend for no one.  
 Given that Alamut is a totalitarian state built on the structure described in 
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Republic and that Hasan is its philosopher-king, what can we make of the fact that 
he does not, as argued by Plato, lead the city in the direction of virtue? Perhaps by 
revisiting concepts of justice, we may make sense of Hasan’s vicious actions in 
Alamut. Karl Popper examines the nature of justice in Republic in Chapter 6 of his 
The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato (1945). He observes that 
when we consider justice, especially those who come from a humanitarian 
perspective, we often associate it with equal treatment of people—before the law, 
in courts, and in advantages as well as burdens. This conception of justice as 
impartiality promotes egalitarianism, the view that all people have equal inherent 
worth and are deserving of equal treatment. Yet, for Plato, minding one’s own 
business by “keep[ing] one’s own station” (i.e. doing the job of one’s own class) 
was considered a virtue (Popper 84). Popper argues that, for Plato, justness is a 
term applied to “that which is in the interest of the best state,” which consists of 
keeping one’s own station insofar as it contributes to the maximal functioning of 
the whole (89). The obligation of the individual to the state necessitates strict 
class distinctions, class rule, and prevention of class mobility. In Plato’s Republic, 
injustice is conceived of as the “changing or intermeddling within the three 
classes” (Popper 78). Whereas the modern western tradition typically identifies 
justice in a lack of privileges among people, Plato identifies it in the strength and 
stability of the unified state. In Popper’s conception of Platonic justice, Alamut is, 
in fact, a just state, complete with stringently assigned roles meant to advance the 
goals of the state and a foreboding emphasis on preserving the status quo. 
Suleiman explains the way of things to ibn Tahir: “That’s just how it is and 
nobody but [Hasan] needs to know why it has to be that way” (48). Everyone 
must comply and trust that Hasan’s dictates are in the best interest of the whole.  
 
The Rise of Totalitarianism in World War II-era Europe 
Popper’s controversial interpretation of Plato’s Republic as oppressively 
totalitarian is grounded in key biographical features of his life, as is the case with 
Bartol’s writing of Alamut and even Plato’s writing of Republic. All three wrote 
during turbulent times, responding to the issues at stake in their respective 
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sociopolitical contexts: Popper and Bartol wrote amidst the Second World War in 
Europe, and Plato wrote in the chaotic aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, which 
was characterized by political executions, the tyrannical dictatorship of The 
Thirty, and a bloody civil war. Born in Vienna in 1902, Popper found inspiration 
for his political philosophy and critique of totalitarianism in the 1938 annexation 
of Austria (Thornton). He was frustrated by the inability of democracy to combat 
the rise of fascism in Austria in the decade following 1920 and by the Marxists’ 
warm reception of it, because he saw its potential to collapse capitalism and set 
the stage for communism (Thornton). Popper revisited Plato—who had, until the 
late nineteenth century, largely been associated with a fantastic utopian vision 
lacking any serious political implications—in order to identify dangers of the 
political structure in Plato’s Republic (Sasaki 5). Writing in these critical war 
years, Popper, like several other philosophers, connected Plato’s theories directly 
to the political landscape that put them into practice, the most extreme examples 
of which are Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and Mussolini’s Italy. Plato’s 
philosophy takes on new life in the political structures, ideologies, and methods of 
these dictatorships. The consequences presented in Alamut also emerge in these 
historical examples, suggesting that Plato’s model can have real-world 
implications that are not particularly optimistic.  
 In Italy, for example, Benito Mussolini forced the king to allow him to 
establish his own government and became its prime minister on October 29, 1922. 
In “Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy,” Simonetta 
Falasca-Zamponi offers explanation for how Mussolini’s regime obliterated the 
nation’s democratic features and established a dictatorship in 1925 through 
“tirelessly invented symbols, myths, cults, and rituals” (6). Mussolini presented 
himself as a heroic, esteemed leader—an image central to the Italian fascist 
ideology that secured his power. This ideology emphasized the revival of the 
prodigious Italian state, rooted in its powerful Roman history, and romanticized 
war as a “potentially regenerative” tool associated with the redemption of its 
power, and also glorified violence as a necessary tool for the “revolution” that it 
claimed would restore the state (Falasca-Zamponi 6-7). The regime united its 
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citizens against outsiders by constructing this ideal of a glorious state; however, 
“the existence of the state depended on people’s faith in it” (Falasca-Zamponi 7). 
In a speech he gave in 1926 for the Novecento Art exhibit, Mussolini claimed that 
“in order to give wise laws to a people it is also necessary to be something of an 
artist” (Falasca-Zamponi 15). Like Hasan, Mussolini treated himself as an artist 
and the state as art: the masses were passive material for him to mold into his 
ideal vision. He perceived them as incapable of reason and critical thinking, 
sentiments echoed in Bartol’s construction of Hasan. His power and influence and 
the desire for more led Mussolini to invade Ethiopia and Greece, to lend support 
to Spanish Fascists during the Spanish Civil War, and to enforce anti-Semitic 
legislation.  
 A similar situation ensued in Germany, where Adolf Hitler, an ally of 
Mussolini, established rule over the Third Reich in 1933. In her Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1958), Hannah Arendt describes how popular support was vital 
even for totalitarian leaders like Hitler (as well as Stalin) to initially assume  
power and then to manipulate the public that gave them that power:  
 
Hitler's rise to power was legal in terms of majority rule and 
neither he nor Stalin could have maintained the leadership of large 
populations, survived many interior and exterior crises, and braved 
the numerous dangers of relentless intra-party struggles if they had 
not had the confidence of the masses. (306)  
 
Like Mussolini and Plato, Hitler promoted a nationalistic ideology in which the 
good connoted the good of the state, not of the individual: “The right is equivalent 
to being good or useful in distinction to its parts” (Arendt 299). Hitler also 
embraced the power of rhetoric to persuade the people, and those who heard him 
speak regarded him as one might a “popular preacher with the power of 
revelation” (Overy 16). He harbored deep contempt for the majority of 
humankind and spoke of his enemies in destructive, hateful language. He 
perceived people as pawns and explained his exceptional influence over the 
crowds by claiming, “The masses are like an animal that obeys its instincts. They 
do not reach conclusions by reasoning” (Overy 19). Plato also insisted on the 
masses’ incapacity for autonomous rational capacity, and Bartol’s Hasan, too, 
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recognized that “the vast multitudes…don’t know [what really is]” and that the 
best a leader can do is feed them “fairy tales and fabrications” (201). Furthermore, 
Hitler capitalized on the inclination of people to conform to group opinion in 
large, emotionally driven crowds: “At a mass meeting, thought is eliminated” 
(Overy 19). Such conformity, if directed toward an end established by an 
influential leader, could achieve a great deal for that leader. Hitler recognized and 
enforced Plato’s point in Republic that the impressionable masses should be 
subjugated to a rational leader. This led to the oppression of entire citizen groups 
through extreme policing by the SS, the suppression of opposition (both civil and 
political), policies of discrimination toward political enemies and certain 
demographics, and ethical atrocities including the Holocaust.  
 Another tyrannical ruler, Joseph Stalin, established a dictatorship in 
Russia in 1922 and took Plato’s conception of the rational leader to the extreme. 
In an interview with an American journalist, he was insulted when asked what 
role luck played in his political career because he attributed superstitious belief in 
gods and devils to “an old Georgian granny” and claimed belief in just one thing: 
“the power of the human will” (Overy 4). He had a “shrewd, informed, cautious, 
and organized intelligence,” and read and wrote extensively (Overy 9). Stalin, like 
Hitler and Bartol’s Hasan, saw people as tools for achieving his alternative 
motives and only kept them around so long as they were of value to him; when 
they stopped being useful, he eliminated them. Distrusting and simultaneously 
distrustful, he was known to be able to gain the faith of someone he was at the 
same time plotting against. Stalin was able to kill thousands of his party members 
and to rule so viciously not because he was sadistic but because he was “a man 
who used the weapons he understood to achieve the central purpose to which his 
life had been devoted since he was a teenager” (Overy 13). He shaped his life and 
actions around a single ideology—that of building and consolidating socialism in 
one country—and did everything in his power to enforce that ideology. Several 
millions of victims are estimated to have died as a direct result of his control, 
notwithstanding those who died from the famines that occurred due to his harsh 
policies. Stalin’s devotion to a sole ideological aim and his two-faced personality 
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are recreated in Hasan, who devotes his life to maximizing political power 
through destroying his enemies and is willing to abuse and backstab his most 
faithful followers to achieve that goal.  
 Hasan serves as a composite representation of these three European 
dictators. He has the compelling charisma and acute intelligence, the impenetrable 
commitment to a purpose and ideology, the contempt for the masses, and a 
fiercely opportunistic perception of those masses. He also brilliantly exploits 
followers’ faith to serve his own agenda. Hasan is hyper-rationalistic and feeds on 
the susceptibility of his followers to emotions and propaganda, taking advantage 
of what he perceives as their inability to think critically and autonomously. It is 
evident how Bartol could be read as responding to the totalitarian uprising in 
Europe, especially in his native Italy, and as constructing a novel that shows the 
traumatic consequences of such absolute political power by someone wise and 
trusted enough to be able to construct and enforce an authoritarian ideology.   
 
Alamut: Plato’s System in Action  
We must first evaluate how Plato arrived at his conception of the just state to 
appreciate what his intentions were and where they could have gone astray. In 
Books II to IV of Republic, Socrates, upon being challenged by Glaucon to 
explain justice of the soul, verbally constructs a just city to explain this virtue. In 
this city, we find three classes: the producers, or working class; the auxiliaries, or 
guardians of the city; and the philosopher-kings, the philosophers who will rule 
over the other classes. Harmony between these classes, located in the proper 
balance of power between them, requires the rulers to decide what is best for the 
city and the producers and guardians to carry out the ruler’s dictates 
unconditionally and unquestioningly. One can already recognize the first signs of 
threat to the citizens’ liberty and rights in a state where they are forbidden from 
challenging their own class position or the authority of their leader. 
 The rulers of the just city must be philosopher-kings because only 
philosophers, Plato emphasizes, are fit for the position. A philosopher is, as the 
term suggests, a lover-of- wisdom, one who desires and pursues all kinds of 
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wisdom and is insatiable for an ever-clearer understanding of truth (Plato 150). 
Plato insists that few qualify as philosophers, but that “members of this small 
group…have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and at the 
same time they’ve also seen the madness of the majority” (170). They recognize 
the susceptibility of the masses to appearances and false beliefs, and they break 
free from the mold and think for themselves. Importantly, they must be both 
naturally adept to practice philosophy and to lead a city. The masses under their 
rule, those guided by belief rather than truth, are best suited to “leave philosophy 
alone and follow their leader” (149). They are not only less capable of thinking 
for themselves but are actually dissuaded from doing so.  
 Alamut’s Hasan-i Sabbah serves as philosopher-king for the Iranian 
fortress of Alamut in 1092. Keen to explore the intricacies of the nature of people 
and the universe since an early age, Hasan dedicated his life to study. A life of 
intense philosophizing and impactful experiences leads Hasan to arrive at a 
radical conclusion which he holds onto as the one guiding truth of his life: the 
truth is unknowable. As Plato figured only a philosopher could, Hasan establishes 
how he penetrated the delusions, particularly religious ones, fed to the masses and  
has discovered true wisdom:  
 
So I divide humanity into two fundamentally different layers: the 
handful that knows what really is, and the vast multitudes that 
don’t know. The former are called to lead, the latter to be led. The 
former are like parents, the latter like children. The former know 
that truth is unattainable, while the latter reach their arms out for it. 
What else can the former do, but feed them fairy tales and 
fabrications? What else are those but lies and deceptions? (201) 
 
Hasan understands that the God-fearing doctrines he and his peers were spoon-fed 
by religious (and so also, at the time, political) authorities from an early age were 
merely constructions designed to elicit obedience from the masses. The prophets 
had to feign performing miracles in order to win the public’s respect and 
ultimately to secure their own power. Without that power, and without the 
supervision of a just God, the masses would have nothing to fear and no way to be 
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controlled. For order to be maintained, they must be told these lies; it is on 
deception, Hasan notes that an institution’s power rests.  
 Plato also argues that deception is necessary for the just republic to 
function optimally. The rulers, he insists, are the only ones justified in executing 
such deception: “If it is appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods for the good of 
the city, because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the rulers. But 
everyone else must keep away from them” (65). Specifically, Plato suggests that 
the guardians of the city, in order to become fearless, needed to “be told stories” 
that instill courage (61). He also endorses telling citizens a noble lie—a myth of 
metals that designates their social positions as God-granted—in order to 
discourage discord by justifying class distinctions. 
 Hasan embraces this storytelling maxim at Alamut in a shocking, though 
ingenious way. His guardian class consists of the fedayeen: Ismaili assassins that 
he has recruited to Alamut and trained rigorously to fight for the Ismaili sect in 
holy war against religious dissidents. Hasan manipulates the religion of Islam, to 
which he knows his soldiers subscribe wholeheartedly, to present himself as the 
voice of and second-in-command to Allah. As such, he tells the fedayeen he has 
the power to deliver them to the paradise promised to virtuous believers after 
death and especially to the martyrs who die for their faith. Hasan anticipates that 
such a hefty claim would invite doubt from the fedayeen, however, and has 
planned for that.  
 Behind the fortress of Alamut, hidden from view from the fedayeen, there 
lie exotic gardens in which Hasan has placed lush plants, exotic animals, and the 
most beautiful young women that could be found far and wide. These women, 
called houris, have been trained in the art of love by a teacher who ensures that 
they seduce without fail and gives them something to tighten themselves in order 
to create the illusion of virginity (most of the houris, however, have extensive sex 
experience as the prized property of prior men). Hasan has a few fedayeen at a 
time drugged and carried into the gardens to be seduced not only by these 
attentive women but also by the allure of the picturesque, soothing setting, so that 
by the time they are re-drugged and carried back to the fortress, they are 
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convinced of having seen paradise. The fact that the men only enter this space at 
night and amidst the minimalist, abstinent lifestyle of a feday make the illusion all 
the more tempting. As we will see, however, not all the fedayeen buy it.  
 This delusion that Hasan has constructed earns him not only the 
fedayeen’s devotion, as they now believe him to be in contact with God, but also 
their unfaltering commitment to him in battle. These men, desperate to be 
reconnected with the pleasures of heaven and assured fully that their sacrifice in 
battle would not be in vain, are more than willing to die for whatever cause he 
deems worthy enough to make martyrs of these men. Their body-breaking 
training as soldiers and the deprivations they endure make them eager to slip back 
into the peaceful existence of paradise and to be remembered as heroes for it.  
 
The Cave of Ignorance  
Beginning in Book VII of Republic, Socrates introduces the famous cave allegory 
that further illuminates the dangers of the kind of deception fundamental to 
Plato’s model, enforced in Alamut, and ubiquitous in totalitarian regimes at large. 
In order to explain the relation of the philosopher-king’s knowledge to the masses 
who are clouded by belief, Socrates likens the life of the masses to an existence 
confined to the walls of a cave. He has us imagine a group of men who, for their 
entire lives, have been chained in a fixed position to one wall while perpetually 
facing the opposite wall. They cannot see behind them, cannot turn to see one 
another, and cannot see themselves. Behind them is a dividing wall, and behind 
that wall are puppeteers who cast shadows on the wall that the prisoners can see. 
These shadows are lit by a fire placed between the prisoners and the puppeteers—
a source of light the prisoners are unaware of. The sounds these puppeteers make 
as they whisper among themselves are believed by the prisoners to come from the 
shadows, which they believe to be figures in themselves. For these prisoners, “the 
truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts” (187). They live in 
perpetual ignorance, believing reality to be what is actually just an illusion, a 
shadow of reality.  
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 Plato conceives of ignorance as a state of delusion that people must 
emerge from painfully and deliberately in order to seek truth: “Consider then, 
what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally 
be like if something like this came to pass…he’d be pained and dazzled and 
unable to see things whose shadows he’d seen before” (187). Such a break from 
accepted reality would be staggering in itself, but the prisoner is still only in the 
first transition out of appearances. The second step requires being led out of the 
cave, which has to this point comprised the prisoner’s entire universe: “And if 
someone dragged him away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and 
didn’t let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn’t he be 
pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, 
with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn’t he be unable to see a single one of those 
things now said to be true?” (188). The freed prisoner’s eyesight would need to 
adjust drastically in order to properly see the world outside of the cave; the 
prisoner would eventually progress from being able to discern shadows, to images 
of people and things, and finally to things in themselves. At the height of the 
prisoner’s exposure to truth, “He’d be able to see the sun, not images of it in water 
or some alien place, but the sun itself” (188). The sun, the prisoner would 
recognize, is the source of everything visible. Now, upon returning to the cave 
after having witnessed these things outside of it, the prisoner would “count 
himself happy for the change and pity the others” (188). The prisoner would 
become distant from worldly human affairs, choosing instead to orient the soul to 
the higher wisdom awaiting outside of the cave. This truth-seeker could better 
rule a city than “people who fight over shadows,” having become equipped to 
make decisions based on the actual nature of things (192). Hasan is the primary 
philosopher-king who has seen the light in the novel, but another one soon 
emerges in his footsteps.  
 
Exit from the Cave 
 Hasan positions himself as one who has awoken and seen the sun (recognizing 
the falsity of religion), returned to the cave (the fortress of Alamut), and taken on 
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leadership of the cave. He sets up a pyramid of power that preserves his absolute 
rule by carefully dispersing knowledge downward through different branches of 
control. Should his religious followers discover that Hasan is willing to have his 
fedayeen kill themselves in the name of the false ideology he has constructed, 
they will distrust and abandon him. From the start of the novel, he refrains from 
showing himself to the members of Alamut in order to preserve the illusion of his 
divinity. He trusts his dais, teachers, and administrators to take care of the 
fedayeen’s training, which is aimed at solidifying the soldiers’ commitment to the 
cause and their preparation to fight to the death for it. The middlemen that execute 
Hasan’s orders are the puppeteers in the cave and the fedayeen are the prisoners.   
 Hasan may have remained the only one on the fortress grounds to fully 
understand the ideology guiding Alamut’s operations had it not been for an 
acutely observant feday by the name of ibn Tahir. Ibn Tahir comes to Alamut to 
join the Ismaili cause and avenge his Ismaili grandfather, and he is received 
graciously for his association with the brave faith-fighter. Almost immediately 
upon his arrival, ibn Tahir questions the happenings at this mysterious fortress: 
“The castle concealed a great mystery, this much he sensed….Would he ever be 
given the chance to remove the veil from it, to look it in the face?” (149). Unlike 
his peers, he attempts to navigate the cave; however, when he tries to explain how 
Alamut’s contradictory religious doctrine can be reconciled with what he knows 
to be true of official Islam doctrine, he is warned to cease his inquiries. The 
fedayeen explain that Hasan “can forbid or permit whatever he wants” and that 
they must obey him in any case (35). They have been taught by the middlemen 
that Hasan can allow what has been forbidden by the Prophet, because “Allah has 
given him the power to issue commandments and prohibitions” as well as the 
ability to open the doors to heaven (159). Hasan has legitimized his absolute 
power by crediting it to God.  
 When he enters paradise, ibn Tahir insists to the houris that it is all a 
dream, perhaps a game devised by Hasan. He insists that he will not be fooled and 
that Hasan’s pellets have put him under this spell. He tugs incessantly at his 
reason to dispel the illusion, reflecting on his feelings to draw himself back to 
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reality. Though he recognizes that it must be a product of “some incredible skill 
of [Hasan’s],” he soon lets down his guard and becomes receptive to the 
pleasurable experience (231). He develops feelings for one of the most beautiful 
girls in the garden, Miriam, and his love for her makes him feel like he is 
genuinely in paradise; he yearns to remain with her. Ibn Tahir recognizes that, 
even if this is all a well-devised deception, his feelings, at least, are real and make 
him want to believe. This is how citizens in a delusive society may be inclined to 
respond: even if they recognize something amiss, it is often easier to yield to an 
immediately rewarding falsity than to suffer for the truth.  
 After the fedayeen are re-drugged and brought back from the garden to 
Alamut, Hasan tests their faith by asking about their experience. The men insist 
that he has delivered them to paradise and that they will testify to their peers 
about his ability to do this and about the bliss they experienced. In the terms of 
the cave allegory, the men have gone from one cave to another and then returned 
to the first ready to preach about a reality that was, in fact, another illusion. Hasan 
is using them as pawns to promote his agenda and to bind more tightly the 
prisoners’ obedience to him. Jokingly, he refers to this stage in his plan as 
“Awakening” or “Return from paradise,” but these are, of course, false stagings 
(251). 
 Ibn Tahir feels a wall rise between the fedayeen and himself, because he 
has been changed by that night. Back at Alamut, he feels deeply melancholic, 
lacking in something essential, and is desperate to return to his beloved. Hasan’s 
deception has produced the intended effect, as the only way for ibn Tahir to return 
to the fantasy is through death. Recognizing ibn Tahir as a reliable candidate 
because of this, Hasan sends him on a suicide mission to kill the grand vizier, an 
enemy of Hasan. He is to travel to the grand vizier’s estate, stab him with a 
poisoned dagger, and then “commend [himself] to Allah” (281). Hasan promises 
him heaven, and Miriam in particular, for his feat. Ibn Tahir is to rest assured that 
this act is in the service of a grander purpose and to execute it without question or 
challenge.  
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 Ibn Tahir accepts, travels to the grand vizier, and stabs him confidently. 
Witnesses are dumbfounded; they have never seen such a bold act, such lack of 
fear for death. They are quick to attribute it to “religious delusion” and “madness” 
(291). The vizier himself is shocked to see the youth of the boy that murdered him 
and questions his purpose in the act. Ibn Tahir defends himself using the false 
Ismaili doctrine, stating that he was executing the orders of a master who had 
been given power by Allah Himself. Having been closely acquainted with Hasan 
in the past, the vizier sees that the boy has been duped and exposes him to the 
deception (i.e., drags him up to the light, despite ibn Tahir’s reluctance to believe 
the truth and forego the old delusions). The truth shocks him, and he must 
reformulate his reality.  
 
Seeing the Sun  
Ibn Tahir learns that he had not, in fact, seen paradise, but instead had seen the 
gardens left behind from previous kings who had them built behind the old castle 
for amusement. The vizier also shares with ibn Tahir the actual, undisclosed 
Ismaili motto: “Nothing is true, everything is permitted” (292). Hasan composed 
this maxim after realizing that the universe is not governed by a just God but is 
actually meaningless and indifferent to humanity; nothing can be determinately 
“true” because there is no universal order to serve as a standard for truth. Given 
the absence of judgment or punishment from a higher entity, humans are free to 
do anything and “everything is permitted” (168). This leaves clear potential for 
chaos, however, so people seeking to prevent anarchical disaster or to exploit this 
understanding in order to gain power can construct ideologies to tame the masses 
and convince them of higher entities; they control through fear. Interestingly, this 
maxim is also believed to reflect the last words of the historical Hasan (Burroughs 
61). The religious reality presented to ibn Tahir and to his peers is simply a 
construction of reality, a shadow on the wall manifested by a master puppeteer. 
The vizier, on his deathbed, sees that “[ibn Tahir] has seen the truth” and frees 
him to return to Alamut alive to reap revenge on Hasan (296).  
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 Meanwhile at Alamut, Hasan has decided to demonstrate the extent of his 
power in front of an enemy army by ordering two of the men who have seen 
paradise, who have craved a return to paradise ever since, to commit public 
suicide on the spot. Both agree without hesitation. One stabs himself and the other 
jumps off a tower; even in death, both men appear ecstatic, like men who find 
salvation in death. This convinces any fedayeen who may have doubted that 
Hasan “is master over life and death for his subjects” that he can, in fact, send 
followers to paradise at will (307). The witnessing fedayeen, too, are now willing 
to follow their peers to paradise.  
  When ibn Tahir returns to the cave of Alamut, it is not as a prisoner, but 
as one who has seen through the shadows and identified their source. As Plato 
predicted, ibn Tahir is shocked by this new reality, which has forced him to 
abandon the one that previously provided false security. Ibn Tahir agonizes: 
“How could he have guessed that a religious leader, whose devoted followers all 
thought he served justice and truth, could be such a vile fraud!” (329). He accuses 
Hasan to his face of deceiving those who had unwavering faith in him in order to 
“accomplish [his] criminal goals” (335). This scene informs a critical point of 
concern in Plato’s theory of justice: the citizens must blindly help their leader 
accomplish his goals, whatever they may be, trusting without question that he 
understands and actually promotes what is best for the state. 
 When ibn Tahir confronts Hasan about his ploy, Hasan patiently listens 
and then proceeds to grant ibn Tahir’s final wish to have a burning question 
answered: “How were you able to come up with such a dirty scheme for us, when 
we’d pledged ourselves to you body and soul?” (335). The dynamic takes a  
critical turn as Hasan calmly discloses his perspective on the truth: 
 
Do you think the overwhelming majority of people care about the 
truth? Far from it! They want to be left alone, and they want fairy 
tales to feed their hungry imaginations. But what about justice? 
They couldn’t care less, as long as you meet their personal needs. I 
didn’t want to fool myself anymore. If this is what humankind is 
like, then exploit its weaknesses to achieve your higher goals, 
which will benefit them too, even though they don’t understand 
that. (336)  
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Hasan has made himself into a prophet for the masses to follow, drawing on their 
gullibility and passion for pleasure to earn their obedience. He emphasizes how a 
person’s subjective paradise provides real pleasure and how, so long as one does 
not see through its illusory nature, one can die happy, something ibn Tahir 
understands as he succumbed to the temporary pleasures of paradise despite 
suspecting their illusory nature. The person whose knowledge prevents 
succumbing to illusion, contrarily, is denied that pleasure and enters what Hasan 
knows to be the lonely and empty space of philosophy. Ibn Tahir, having reached 
transcendent understanding, has now accessed truth: he has left the cave and seen 
the sun. Hasan frees him to travel and study the world. Plato emphasizes that 
philosopher-kings must be selected from the best of the auxiliaries; Ibn Tahir has, 
from the start, outshone his peers in intellect and courage, and it is fitting that he 
has ascended intellectually to the rank of philosopher.  
 
Ideology in Modern Terrorism  
The justice promoted by Plato’s state leaves substantial potential for corruption. It 
can quickly become an excuse for the violation of human rights in the service of 
ideologies created by leaders whose wisdom enables their manipulative 
techniques. The consequences of the system Plato advances are increasingly 
evident in Alamut as, one by one, those who have been made players in Hasan’s 
political games fall tragic victims to it. As a consequence of all the deception, two 
of the houris and two of the fedayeen take their own lives. Ibn Tahir, too, would 
have died in vain had the truth not been revealed to him in time. Hasan’s 
leadership, rather than promoting virtue and harmony, wrecks human lives to 
advance the state’s/his goals.  
 The issues at stake, particularly as they affect human lives, transcend 
Alamut, permeating western culture today in its relation to Islamic extremism. In 
Trends in Modern International Terrorism, Boaz Ganor concedes the difficulty of 
defining terrorism because of the tendency to perceive it as freedom fighting, but 
generally conceptualizes it as the “deliberate use of violence aimed against 
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civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, 
ideological, religious, etc.)” (21). In Alamut, Hasan outlines such political goals 
and sends his fedayeen to enforce them through violence.  
 Modern terrorist organizations, like Alamut and the totalitarian regimes of 
Europe, direct all of their efforts and resources, up to and including human lives, 
toward a single ideological agenda. Though there are certainly vast varieties of 
terrorist organizations at work today with unique methods and missions, I will 
focus on a particularly ideologically driven one—al-Qaeda, an Islamic extremist 
group. In his essay “Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism,” Rohan 
Gunaratna, Head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research, explains how al-Qaeda followers perceive the US and Israel as co-
conspirators working on a global level to oppress Islam and its followers. They 
despise American presence in the Arabian Peninsula and blame the US 
government, people, and foreign policy for the suffering in the Muslim world. Al-
Qaeda aims to combat these culprits by consolidating a united Islamic nation that 
permits force, if necessary. It targets those who do not share its worldview, both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, and teaches that it is “a religious duty of Muslims 
around the world to wage jihad on the American land, American citizens, Israel 
and Jews” (Gunaratna 7).  
 Their ideology, popularly called jihadism, actually contradicts most 
Islamic religious teachings (like Hasan’s does). However, it maintains strong 
support because it provides religious justification for terrorism and defends Al-
Qaeda as an institution “defend[ing] the dignity and pride of the nation” 
(Gunaratna 6-7). Adherents’ loyalty is further solidified by the belief in 
martyrdom that drives the mission: “Al-Qaeda’s operatives firmly believe that 
Allah guides and rewards those who sacrifice themselves for a noble cause” 
(Gunaratna 8). The belief that God will guide and reward those who sacrifice 
dispels terrorists’ doubts or hesitations, as it does for the fedayeen in Alamut. It 
also helps to create a unified collective working toward the same goals by  
minimizing internal discord: 
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The baiah or the pledge of allegiance serves as an assurance that 
those affiliating themselves to the organization are committed to 
the organization’s ideology. By instituting it, the organization is 
freed from conceptual problems arising from differences in 
opinion. To a certain degree, through it an acceptable level of 
uniformity is maintained which contributes to the organization’s 
stability and ease of management and administration. (Gunaratna 
8) 
 
Ideology is the critical driving force for al-Qaeda, above publicity, money, and/or 
fame. The organization’s ideology legitimizes its mission and justifies its chosen 
means to its end. Though Osama Bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, is “demonized 
in the Western media,” his followers and fighters see him as a hero who had 
forsaken his wealthy comforts to live among his poor followers and help them 
defend their faith (Gunaratna 9). Gunaratna emphasizes that, more so than its 
tactics, it is al-Qaeda’s creed that is most threatening and powerful, and that those 
waging war on the terrorist organization can only succeed by challenging its very 
ideology.  
 
How Alamut Advances Orientalist Ideologies  
At the same time that Alamut cautions against ideology as a manipulative tool, it 
also proliferates certain ideologies itself. We must ask why Bartol, who was 
writing in Slovenia in the 1900s, chose to set his novel in eleventh century Iran. 
The obvious answer is that he wanted to make visible a critique of totalitarianism 
without being personally targeted. As aforementioned, the communist 
Yugoslavian regime felt threatened by Alamut. Situating it in a time and place so 
alien to his contemporaries was likely a safeguard against persecution or 
censorship.  
 The decision to set it in Persia, however, places Bartol within a European 
tradition of appropriating Middle Eastern culture for self-interested purposes. In 
“Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai explore how long-standing 
racial ideologies caricature and stereotype Islamic terrorists. They describe the 
cliché perception of Islamic terrorists in post-September 11 America: “We hear 
often the idea that sexually frustrated Muslim men are promised the heavenly 
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reward of sixty, sixty-seven, or sometimes even seventy virgins if they are 
martyred in jihad” (Puar and Rai 124). Bartol ties this idea to Alamut directly. 
The terrorist is posited as abnormal, a “racial and sexual monster” symbolizing 
the deviant psyche in the Western notion of the individual (Puar and Rai 124-25). 
Hasan’s operations at Alamut demonstrate nothing if not deviancy, and the 
fedayeen are portrayed as willing to die for, among other reasons, the virgins of 
paradise, exhibiting the stereotyped “sexual depravity of the Oriental torrid zone” 
(Puar and Rai 124).  
 In a note preceding Alamut, the publisher claims, “in publishing this book, 
we aim to undermine hateful stereotypes, not reinforce them” (i). They insist that 
the ideologies the novel cautions against are intended to symbolize the nature and 
dangers of ideologies in general, not to suggest that Islam or even religion in 
general incline one toward terrorist activity. The characters in the novel should 
not, the publisher emphasizes, be interpreted as representing Islam or the 
religion’s endorsement of violence. However, the question of why the Middle 
East was singled out among all the regions to have produced extremist groups 
throughout history, from the Japanese to the European, still stands, and we are 
brought back to where we began, with the West’s tradition of using the Middle 
East as a whipping boy for fanaticism.  
 Biggins also addresses the stereotypes operating in Alamut and attempts to 
caution against them in an ironic afterword to Alamut titled “Against Ideologies.” 
Biggins realizes that “the most blinkered reading of Alamut might reinforce some 
stereotypical notions of the Middle East as the exclusive home of fanatics and 
unquestioning fundamentalists” (386). Besides reiterating the presence of such a 
risk for misinterpretation, Biggins does little to justify Bartol’s decision to take 
that risk and instead hands responsibility to the reader to “come away from 
Alamut with something very different” (386). His defense certainly seems at odds, 
though, with the novel’s back cover, which lures readers using Orientalist cliches: 
“If you want to learn the true story behind the 72 virgins awaiting al-Quaeda’s 
martyrs in paradise, Alamut is the training manual.” 
 Bartol elucidated his motivations for Alamut in a commentary he 
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published for the 1957 edition of the novel. In it, he suggests that readers focus 
less on Hasan’s “terrible, inhuman, and despicable” methods and instead 
appreciate the solidarity and human connection fostered in response to these by 
the fedayeen and the houris (388-89). He praises the values of friendship, love, 
and truth, moralizing while evading the elephant in the room: why use this 
completely unfamiliar Middle Eastern setting and not so much as address its use?  
 I am not suggesting that Bartol was consciously forwarding a racist 
ideology; instead, I propose that his work produced such an ideology despite his 
intentions. In fact, the inevitably of the reproduction of this ideology is precisely 
the point: even a criticism of ideology cannot escape ideology. In “Orientalism in 
Bartol’s Novel Alamut,” Mirt Komel explains how the novel was first published 
in the United States following Al-Qaeda’s September 11 terrorist attacks and was 
used to explain the “irrational behaviour of Islamic extremists, who disregard 
their own personal safety and have no moral compunction in killing civilians” 
(357). By conceiving of them as irrational, we distinguish ourselves from and 
polarize terrorists, making it easier to forget their humanity and the incredibly 
diverse motivations driving their behavior. Furthermore, we risk viewing them as 
reflecting a broader group of people, particularly when they become our only 
point of contact with an entire religion or country. Alamut became Slovenia’s 
most successful piece of literature known abroad, “all the while reproducing 
Orientalist stereotypes disguised as answers to complex political and cultural 
problems” (Komel 357). For some, this novel could be the only representation 
they have ever encountered of the Middle East. Hence, while Alamut warns 
against reproducing Plato’s ideologically driven political model, the reader must 
remember that it also reproduces stereotypes about a complex demographic. 
Indeed, this very essay could be read as perpetuating certain Orientalist ideologies 
for its selection of Al-Qaeda to exemplify modern terrorism; this is why thinking 
for oneself and seeking truth through different sources (a key lesson of Alamut, as 
well) is of vital importance.  
 A more subtle lesson we may draw from Alamut is that one way to escape 
ideology is to create one’s own and detach from it post-production, as Hasan did. 
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However, as Alamut shows, such an existence is painfully lonely. Perhaps Plato 
designed his republic to be led by someone who would deny any emotion and 
human connection; such a leader could make citizens happy with fantasies while 
being fully aware of their spuriousness. Hasan often mentions how his followers 
found bliss in his illusion. And some, like the fedayeen who committed suicide 
for it, died ecstatic and fulfilled. In this interpretation, Hasan appears as the most 
altruistic of people, serving as a god on Earth who constructs truth for his 
adherents in a way that gives them real joy at the cost of his intellectual 
loneliness. However, this interpretation fails to rectify the fates of those who did 
not die blissfully, such as the heartbroken houris who lost their loved ones. When 
deception enters the political formula, citizens are from the very outset denied 
justice by being denied the right to the truth and the ability to make fully informed 
decisions. As Plato himself emphasized, truth is the highest good and is 
categorically superior to all beliefs and appearances, no matter how pleasant they 
may be (1049). 
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